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Abstract: This article provides insights valuable to transitioning
America’s military intelligence resources from counterinsurgency
operations to the force necessary for responding to a near-peer
competitor in a major war.

T

he US Army has arguably not fought a capable state adversary
since World War II. Now, after decades of conducting limited
interventions, the expansibility and adaptability of military
intelligence capabilities are in question. In a potential major war, the fight
will focus on decisive operations and owning terrain, but it will also have to
deal with the added complexities of globalization, advanced technologies,
state-sponsored hybrid adversaries, and nonstate irregulars.1 This article
examines how US military intelligence would expand in the event of a
major war that required the Army to double in size and capability.
The Army’s Military Intelligence Corps would have to expand
accordingly through a doubling of expeditionary military intelligence
brigades and theater intelligence brigades, while incrementally expanding
support at the strategic level. But, such an expansion would also affect
“intelligence federations” within the intelligence community, which
includes the Army Reserve, National Guard, civilians, and contractors,
as well as its coalition partners.
1

Assumptions

In addition to doubling the Army, another major assumption is that
the continental infrastructure of the United States, though vulnerable to
cyberattack and sabotage, will remain relatively safe from massive kinetic
attacks from long-range missiles. The architecture and communication
systems that make sharing intelligence possible may be degraded, but
they may not be completely destroyed.
Third, US Army forces will be dedicated explicitly to each theater
of operations in question. Hence, a two-front scenario, such as one
involving Country A in European Command’s area of responsibility
and Country B in Pacific Command’s area of responsibility, would
require military intelligence to increase linguists, cultural experts, and
foreign area officers for Countries A and B, who are knowledgeable
in those theaters of operations. Military intelligence forces would need
to be flexible and modular, able to shift resources between combatant
commands throughout the theater intelligence brigade structure to
1     David Johnson, Redefining Boundaries for the 21st Century Land Force (Carlisle, PA, US Army War
College, December 10, 2016), briefing slides..
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reinforce each region.2 Joint intelligence operations will continue to be
conducted with operators and analysts from the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
Fourth, decision-makers will select the right force structure for a
major war. Military intelligence currently supports the Army service
component at the command, corps, theater, division, and lower levels.
To expand in a major war, military intelligence support would remain
consistent with active duty divisions and therefore expand in concert
with them. Staying within the bounds of current units, and within the
constraint of doubling brigade combat teams, intelligence units would
then double at the expeditionary brigade, theater intelligence brigade,
and strategic levels, which would all increase by seven.3

Expanding Military Intelligence

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence describes the
intelligence community as “a federation of executive branch agencies
and organizations that work separately and together to conduct
intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations
and the protection of the national security of the United States.”4 The
largest restructuring of the intelligence community since its inception
came from implementing the recommendations in the 9/11 Commission
Report. Among many changes, the one with the greatest impact unified
“the many participants . . . and their knowledge in a network-based
information-sharing system that transcends traditional governmental
boundaries.”5 Vertical stovepipes became more horizontal due to a new
paradigm of intelligence sharing that ensured each organization was not
an independent entity but rather an integrated, coordinating part of a
greater community of 17 federal organizations.6
Lieutenant General Mary Legere (Retired), a former Army G-2,
defines the intelligence federation as a “national and tactical community
of interests that includes the Interagency, a coalition of the willing, and
your formal and informal intelligence organizations, as well as others
that can contribute to your mission.”7 Building a solid federation means
aligning the national mission to the tactical objective, having good endto-end federation doctrine, and exercising the federation from the top
down and then back up. The federated intelligence enterprise—with
increased analysis, predictions, and value to decision-makers—is the
starting point in a major war.
2      MG George Franz (commanding general, US Army Intelligence and Security Command),
interview by author, November 14, 2016.
3      Other assumptions for this study: six Army Service Component Commands for the six
Geographic Combatant Commands; combat support units above corps will increase slightly;
combat support units at corps level and below would double, consistent with the increase in combat
units. Corps would increase from three to six. Divisions would increase from 18 to 36. Total BCT
expansion would be from 57 to 114.
4      “Frequently Asked Questions,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
February 28, 2017, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/faq?start=2.
5      National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9-11 Commission), The
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
(Washington, DC: 9-11 Commission, 2004), 400.
6      “Members of the Intelligence Community,” ODNI, February 28, 2017, https://www.dni
.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic.
7      LTG (Ret) Mary A. Legere (former US Army G-2), interview with author, October 30, 2016.
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During interviews for this study, intelligence leaders repeatedly
mentioned three areas that require special attention in order to expand
the Army intelligence corps: (1) shortages of airborne intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; (2) limited processing,
exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capacities; and (3) insufficient
human intelligence and counterintelligence capacities.
The insatiable appetite for ISR, “a continuous, recursive operation
focused on the collection of relevant information that is analyzed to
create intelligence to inform the commander’s visualization,” would
continue.8 To increase collection of the necessary intelligence ISR brings,
the US Army would need multimission aircraft capable of acquiring
signals intelligence and full-motion video while simultaneously
operating as a shooter, which would mean an increased production
of airborne platforms that could exponentially expand the capacity to
collect intelligence.9
Processing, exploitation, and dissemination is “the execution
of the related functions that converts and refines collected data into
usable information, distributes the information for further analysis, and
provides combat information to commanders and staffs.”10 In wartime,
there will be an exponential need to refine data into usable intelligence
for further analysis and dissemination, necessitating increased stateside
PED battalions.
In terms of human intelligence and counterintelligence, there
has always been the challenge of having trained personnel with the
requisite language skills and cultural knowledge to collect intelligence
through interpersonal means and to thwart our enemies’ intelligence
gathering. Human intelligence provides crucial knowledge not only of
enemy capabilities but also of their intentions. As a current commander
on the ground and consumer of intelligence put it, “there is nothing
better than a human eyeball answering the commander’s priority
intelligence requirements.”11

Expanding Skills and Capabilities

An obvious solution to expanding capacity is to acquire and to
retain personnel with the right balance of skills. Many intelligence
military operational specialties are currently considered low density—a
few soldiers with the specialty are required within the organization
or unit, and without those essential skills, various tasks and missions
could not be completed. These specialties span six basic intelligence
skill sets, or collection disciplines, of signals intelligence (SIGINT),
imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence

8       Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), The Stryker Brigade Combat Team
Infantry Battalion, Field Manual 3-21.21 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2003), 3-1. For more on the
ISR enterprise and the increased demand for it, see Government Accountability Office (GAO),
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: DOD Can Better Assess and Integrate ISR Capabilities and Oversee
Development of Future ISR Requirements, GAO-08-374 (Washington, DC: GAO, 2008).
9      MG Mark R. Quantock (former director, J-2, US Central Command), interview with author,
November 9, 2016.
10      COL Constantin Nicolet, 201st Expeditionary Military Intelligence Brigade (Ft. Lewis, WA:
Military Intelligence Readiness Command, leader professional development brief, February 28,
2017), briefing slides.
11      MG Paul J. LaCamera (deputy commanding general, XVIII Airborne Corps), interview with
author, November 2, 2016.
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(MASINT), human-source intelligence (HUMINT), open-source
intelligence (OSINT), and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).12
Growing the intelligence workforce will be a difficult and complex
challenge. The intelligence corps will be competing for manpower with
all other branches, so in terms of rapid expansibility, leaders must define
which intelligence disciplines will be needed immediately, which would
be needed within 90 days, and what the force could wait on.13 There will
be a call for bigger, better, and faster intelligence from the beginning of
the US Army’s preparations for war, yet the availability of skills will need
to be prioritized. During the first 90 days, leaders would have to rank
the hard-to-get and hard-to-develop intelligence disciplines in terms of
depth, complexity, training, and certification against those disciplines
that are acquired faster or require less skill. Structuring a pipeline by
first placing the right people in the specialties that take longer to develop
would allow more risk in lower-skill sets that can be slowly filled.
Currently, intelligence has difficulty filling high-demand, lowdensity specialties in the signal and human intelligence disciplines.
The skills required for signal and cyber are more complex than ever
as the technical aspects of those missions have increased. For human
and counterintelligence, seasoned soldiers with more life experience
generally perform better, making recruiting a young soldier to be a
successful agent difficult. After recruiting for these high-demand, lowdensity specialties, the intelligence corps will eventually need to expand
all intelligence disciplines.
While training acts as a choke point, technology can help in an
expansion. Intelligence leaders will need to shorten the training pipelines
for a quicker throughput of qualified soldiers.14 In the absence of enough
qualified, cleared, and trained people, intelligence will need automated
tools that can do what people currently do. Specific areas where
intelligence could develop new automated tools include the insatiable
appetite for ISR, the need for more PED, and the explosion of raw data.
Humans cannot be taken out of the intelligence process, but
technology can provide increased throughput and reduce the cognitive
burden on analysts. Doing so would allow analysts to manage the
volume and variety of intelligence data and the reporting necessary to
answer intelligence requirements while reducing the risk of missing
key and essential information. Incorporating new technologies that
automate processes will also free up personnel for other tasks. The
Army needs to optimize the use of current sensors and baseline systems,
but then it must adapt those systems, or commission new systems, for
unanticipated needs, all while ensuring commonality of architecture and
interoperability for sharing.15
Synchronizing the efforts of multiple intelligence agencies to limit
duplicated efforts is essential. The recent conflict in Iraq demonstrated
that, at the onset of war, most national agencies shifted their attention
from around the world to Iraq. An initial lack of deconfliction and
12      “Frequently Asked Questions,” ODNI.
13      BG Karen H. Gibson (former director, CJ2, Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent
Resolve), interview with author, November 11, 2016.
14      Quantock, interview.
15      Franz, interview.
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coordination meant several different agencies were duplicating collection
and analytical efforts, adding to inefficiency while decreasing capacity.16
The National Intelligence Support Plan is an effort to integrate theater
and national intelligence capabilities, to synchronize intelligence
operations, and to identify gaps in supporting a combatant command’s
mission.17 A well-defined intelligence support plan between units,
between tactical and higher-level headquarters, and with strategic-level
intelligence agencies deconflicts intelligence tasks and synchronizes
capabilities among the various players.

Army Reserve

One of the assumptions identified at the beginning of this paper
was a recall of all individuals in the Army Reserve and National Guard
to active duty. As the reserve component becomes fully mobilized,
the current units of action (7,500 soldiers) in the Military Intelligence
Readiness Command would be activated.
According to the current commander, Brigadier General Christie
Nixon, doubling quickly is not a viable option for the reserve component.18
In one proposal, the Reserve would add two additional expeditionary
military intelligence brigades and one additional theater brigade, which
would augment intelligence support by about 2,100 soldiers.
In order to understand intelligence in the reserve component, one
needs to understand the Military Intelligence Readiness Command,
a new paradigm of reserve support formed in 2005. Aggregating 75
percent of intelligence forces in the Reserve, the functional command
provides “operational intelligence support to nearly every national
intelligence agency and combatant command, and conducts multidiscipline intelligence operations in support of Army Service Component
Commands and worldwide contingency operations.”19
Select units and theater support battalions are operationally aligned
with Intelligence and Security Command theater intelligence brigades
and units, while the expeditionary brigades are aligned with corps.20
Mission and vision alignment among the regular Army, Reserve, and
National Guard at the theater level is imperative and will need to
continue to enable a quick expansion that balances the right skills and
mitigates gaps.21
What is compelling about the Military Intelligence Readiness
Command is its ability to provide units for current operations under
its Title 10 mission requirements while providing significant support
to civilian agencies, particularly the Defense Intelligence Agency.22 In
a major war, the type of support currently provided by the command
16      Legere, interview.
17      US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Joint
Publication 2-01 (Washington, DC: JCS, 2012), IV-5.
18      BG Christie L. Nixon (commander, Military Intelligence Readiness Command), interview
with author, November 30, 2016.
19      Nixon, interview; and “Military Intelligence Readiness Command,” US Army Reserve,
January 30, 2017, http://www.usar.army.mil/Commands/Operational-Functional/MIRC/.
20      Nixon, interview.
21      Franz, interview.
22      LTC Bryan L. Bain, Army Reserve Military Intelligence: Time for Change, Civilian Research Project
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2010), 10.
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will need even greater communication and connectivity. These
communication hubs will be vulnerable to kinetic attacks, cyberattacks,
and degradation through overburdening the system.
The processing and analysis system, the Distributed Common
Ground System-Army, gathers intelligence from all echelons,
enables operational visualization, provides situational awareness, and
disseminates data.23 Before a conflict, the system needs to be standardized
for interconnectivity between military intelligence agencies and the
entire intelligence community. Leaders will also need to reduce Reserve
support at the strategic level and to national intelligence agencies, which
could arguably be provided by civilian hires, to meet the intelligence
requirements of the fighting force.
In preparation for a major war, decision-makers should build Army
Reserve capacity; specifically, military intelligence could be supported
by increasing the number of processing, exploitation, and dissemination
platoons for full motion video and interrogation capabilities.24 Three
interrogation battalions in the reserve component are not sufficient to
provide interrogators and interrogation facilities theater entry capability
that is generally essential to mission success.
With the active component losing its interrogation capacity, the
Army’s entire interrogation capacity will soon reside in the reserve
component. Planners also need to include reserve forces into combatant
command theater contingency plans so that time-phased force
deployment data gets sourced with these units.25 The conversation
regarding the flow of resources should occur during the planning phase,
so mobilizing necessary reserve support becomes easier.
A current challenge is tracking the outflow of both active duty and
reserve intelligence personnel. Human Resources Command and the
Military Intelligence Readiness Command need to ensure an accurate
roster of departing personnel and their associated skills. These personnel
typically get placed into the Individual Ready Reserve, which “consists
of a pool of individual soldiers who have been trained, through their
service in the active forces or in the Selected Reserve, and are available
for mobilization in time of war or national emergency.”26 Having a list of
former intelligence personnel who have been trained and who are easily
reached in time of war provides a straightforward way to expand quickly.
Shortening the training pipeline is another imperative for rapid
expansion. Civilian capabilities allow reservists to bring context and
knowledge from the private sector for a more nuanced understanding
on the ground. Yet this “dual life” makes it difficult for reserve soldiers
to maintain certifications because the lengthy training and certification
times surpass even the limiting factor of funding.27 Instead of adding
standards and certificate requirements, decision-makers need to be
realistic about essential skills and balance the intelligence corps’s
23      “Distributed Common Ground System-Army,” Distributed Common Ground SystemArmy, February 1, 2017, https://dcgsa.army.mil/about/.
24      Nixon, interview.
25      Nixon, interview.
26      Secretary of the Army, memorandum, “Army Directive 2017-09 (Management of the
Individual Ready Reserve),” Washington, DC, February 6, 2017, 1.
27      Nixon, interview.
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resources where risks are the greatest. In a major war, a firm grounding
in the truly essential skills of certain specialties and on-the-job training
will be the winning strategy.

National Guard

The National Guard military intelligence force of just under
11,000 professionals resides at the strategic level in the 300th Military
Intelligence Brigade (Linguists), at the operational level in two new
expeditionary brigades (the 58th and the 71st), and in the eight division
headquarters in the G-2.28 At the tactical level, the National Guard
also uses military intelligence companies within the 28 brigade combat
teams. Accordingly, the National Guard primarily holds division G-2
positions, analysis and control elements, and military intelligence
companies that deploy in support of the brigade combat teams. In
wartime, this intelligence structure would expand by two additional
expeditionary brigades, increasing the National Guard intelligence
force by about 1,400. The 300th Brigade (Ling) would grow to the size
of the theater intelligence brigades with a linguist battalion aligned to
each. This expanded brigade would provide interrogation, signal, and
human-intelligence support to the Intelligence and Security Command
as necessary in the appropriate theater.
The National Guard is postured for the possibility of full mobilization
and would rely on the regional training institutes in Utah and Georgia
that operate under the One Army School System with the US Army
Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca. Whereas one of the
largest constraints among active duty, reserve, and National Guard
soldiers is institutional training, one key to expanding the intelligence
force would be minimizing the training timeline while maintaining the
quality of instruction. Increasing the course load while shortening the
timeline for Advanced Individual Training would train the specialties
in highest demand: intelligence analysts, human intelligence collectors,
cryptologic linguists, and counterintelligence agents. As a member of the
Army intelligence enterprise, the National Guard will need to continue to
provide sufficient Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet)
bandwidth to remain on the secret-level network 24/7 for training or
accommodating a large reach-back expansion. The communications
pipelines will have to expand for increased support in a major war.29
The National Guard would continue to train and to maintain
military intelligence readiness prior to such a conflict. The federal
military intelligence mission allows the National Guard to build
readiness while supporting preparedness for state missions. With full
mobilization authority from the president, the National Guard will
mobilize to support the fight as well as support homeland defense and
homeland security missions in support of a governor, the Department
of Homeland Security, and US Northern Command. Based on federal
and state requirements, the National Guard will manage the force
to provide optimal support to both the conflict and the homeland.30

28      COL Greg Hadfield (director, National Guard Bureau Chief ’s Action Group), interview with
author, November 30, 2016.
29      Hadfield, interview.
30      “Intelligence,” National Guard, January 30, 2017, https://www.nationalguard.com
/careers/intelligence.
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Once law enforcement is able to provide homeland defense and security
requirements, however, National Guard assets are transitioned to
forward mobilization.

Civilians

An advantage military intelligence has over other Army branches
is the depth of its federated enterprise. The current estimated total
workforce of civilians, contractors, and uniformed soldiers working
in the national intelligence community is 183,000.31 Within that pool,
contractors are estimated at 58,000 personnel, or 32 percent of the
total workforce.32
One possibility for rapidly expanding at the strategic level,
and perhaps even at the operational level, is to increase the civilian
component of the Army intelligence enterprise. This solution avoids the
exigent physical and health standards of the Army as well as the more
laborious process of recruiting people into the military. Specifically
designating civilian positions that need not be forward deployable has
some basic advantages, such as relieving the government of educational
benefits or costly Veterans Affairs benefits after the conclusion of a
war. Furthermore, these civilians can work reach-back intelligence
support from safe locations within the United States and select locations
overseas. Minimizing the number of uniformed soldiers working in
national intelligence while maximizing their presence at the tactical and
operational levels will put more uniform-wearing intelligence specialists
down at the fighting-force level.

Contractors

In addition to expanding civilian roles in the Army intelligence
enterprise, expertise could be added from the intelligence contracting
industry.33 Defense firms have personnel with the full set of intelligence
skill sets and requisite clearances. Military intelligence leaders can use
them to fill agency gaps, to complete emergent taskers, or to focus
on developing future technology solutions. Many of these companies
hire former military intelligence analysts and employ current members
of the Reserve—an estimated 20 percent of contractors are also
Reserve soldiers.34
Defense companies have also built sensitive compartmented
intelligence facilities (SCIFs) for intelligence communications. Certain
intelligence disciplines, like the high-demand, low-density specialties
mentioned previously, cannot be built quickly. Cooperation with private
industry will help mitigate these gaps in the force until the Army recruits
and trains replacements.
The contractor workforce will need to augment any support
that does not exist in the current forward-deployed Corps structure.
Currently, knowledge management, intelligence systems architecture,

31      Tim Shorrock, “Five Corporations Now Dominate Our Privatized Intelligence Industry,”
Nation, September 8, 2016.
32      Shorrock, “Five Corporations.”
33      Quantock, interview.
34      Nixon, interview.
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and dissemination are not present within the corps-level G-2 staff.35 Such
staffs are busy conducting intelligence analysis; processing, exploitation,
and dissemination with minimal dissemination outside of the corps
structure; and briefing the theater commander. Hence, the auxiliary
duties of knowledge management and intelligence systems architecture
could be assumed by contractors or a civilian workforce.
The difficulty in predicting where future conflicts will occur limits
decision-makers’ ability to know what linguistic and cultural expertise
capabilities should be built in advance.36 Contracting this type of
specialty to defense firms will increase the availability of native speakers,
who also understand the unspoken language, such as body language,
and the cultural context of the society.37 These cultural skills are hard to
acquire through language school alone. By using contractor expertise,
the intelligence corps can easily draw upon a linguist or cultural expert
without maintaining such expertise when it is not necessary.38
Two obstacles to expanding the contractor workforce rapidly are
funding and vetting. The typical planning, programming, budgeting,
and executing of the governmental budgetary process is too lengthy,
creating a major choke point. Overseas Contingency Operations funds,
or war funds, is a strategic resource that could be used to fund contractors
more efficiently in a major war.39 Further extending the timeline for
expansion, the current individual security clearance process takes over
two years. Part of this constraint comes from a legitimate need to run
thorough background checks on contractors due to past leaks and
security breaches, which skews and slows the clearance process. During
wartime, however, risk calculators will need to be adjusted to meet
urgent demands while maintaining the appropriate security posture.

Coalition Partners

In a major war, the United States would most likely participate as a
member of a coalition or an alliance. Cultivating the intelligence corps
within that coalition will help America follow its doctrine of “by, with,
and through” others.40 Some of our current coalition partners in the
Middle East have already started to develop a more robust intelligence
corps and strategic intelligence agencies.41 It is important for the United
States to encourage those activities, as our coalition partners would not
only know their backyards best, but their intelligence forces also act
as a force multiplier to speed military intelligence expansion through
other means.

35      Gibson, interview.
36      As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated, “When it comes to predicting the nature and
location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have
never once gotten it right.” Micah Zenko, “100% Right 0% of the Time: Why the US Military
Cannot Predict the Next War,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2012.
37      Quantock, interview.
38      Gibson, interview.
39      Franz, interview.
40      GEN Joseph Votel (commander, US Central Command), discussion with author,
October 2017.
41      Legere, interview.
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Conclusion

During the past decade of conflicts, American tactics, techniques,
and procedures, as well as networks, were cleared for intelligence sharing.
While the first step is to ensure intelligence agreements with security
classification guides are in place, preferably prior to a conflict, they must
be continually refined. Early investments can occur with open-source
sharing, analytic exchanges, training, and exercises, and then expanded
by collaboration among multiple intelligence disciplines. Dedicated
coalition intelligence sharing will naturally grow as relationships and
partnerships deepen.42
The key at the beginning of a war is to establish the network
and the classification guidelines to support coalition operations, and
then to engineer those requirements into an information technology
architecture for coalition communications. Resource management
officials from all countries need to collaborate early to define a new
coalition-sharing architecture.43 Military intelligence leaders will need
to be ready to implement new laws, policies, and authorities to ensure
intelligence sharing with partners is successful.
The essential mission of military intelligence is to collect and to
analyze all relevant information that supports command decisionmaking in wartime. In coordination with doubling the size of the Army
to meet a potential near-peer threat, military intelligence would also
need to expand quickly and effectively to perform its mission.
To expand intelligence, leaders would need to address the challenges
of doubling the expeditionary brigades and the theater intelligence
brigades while incrementally expanding intelligence support at the
strategic level. Smartly expanding personnel resources in the right
competencies is important, but it is not the only concern. Leaders
will also need to address system shortfalls in processing, exploitation,
and dissemination; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and
human intelligence capabilities, as well as develop technological tools to
increase throughput and synchronize intelligence plans throughout the
intelligence federation.
Leaders must take full advantage of the Army Reserve, National
Guard, civilians, and contractors, as well as coalition partners to reach
the necessary expansion goals. Each of these components adds value to
a coordinated intelligence federation and must be leveraged to expand
intelligence capacity quickly during a major war.

42      Gibson, interview.
43      Quantock, interview.
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